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Introduction: The problem of an undifferentiated socio-materiality 
This chapter aims to provide one possible answer to a simple question, lying at the heart of 
this volume: How can we adequately theorize the built world we inhabit? In recent 
discussions, begun in the journal “City” in 2011, we were basically presented with two 
options: we could either think about this world in terms of “urbanisation” as seen from the 
viewpoint of critical urban studies, a world becoming more and more city like (Brenner et al. 
2011). Alternatively, we could theorize it as a socio-material world in the terms of assemblage 
theory (Farías 2011).  
While many in the debate agreed that a “socio-material” theory can be a fruitful way to think 
about the built world, I share Hilary d’Angelo’s observation of this debate, that we deal here 
with a „somewhat chaotic category of ‘sociomaterialities’“ (Angelo 2011, 570). This “chaotic 
category” largely suffers from the problem that many studies on the urban as socio-material 
show that the urban is somehow socio-materially constituted but struggle to find meaningful 
further distinctions. d’Angelo further observed that the problem of such undifferentiated 
socio-materiality was based in the assemblage urbanists “presuming agency, and fetishizing 
the sociomaterial itself”, while the critical theorists “prematurely circumscribe it“ (Angelo 
2011, 572). As she rightly states, the question is to „identify the relevant differences between 
objects, now that we have shown their ontological similarity“ (Angelo 2011, 575).  
This essay then attempts to elucidate some “relevant differences between objects” with regard 
to how they locate social processes. My answer aims to observe the patterning of different 
kinds of objects and more specifically, how their relations change over time.  
My main departure point is to go back to the original ideas of ANT about technologies, or 
“immutable mobiles”, and compare these to other things. Such a comparison serves to avoid 
two pitfalls. First, it avoids to assume that ontologies are contingent for each thing. Rather, as 
I aim to show, we can distinguish different kinds of socio-materialities that are relevant for 
the study of urban assemblages. Second, it avoids to presume the existence of cities and its 
other as a-priori relevant objects of analysis.  
Regarding the first pitfall, this route follows a different path than many recent “ontological” 
studies within STS, whose main goal was to demonstrate the multiplicity of objects (Mol 
2003) or material politics (Marres 2013). Such studies engage primarily in a discussion about 
the relationship between things and politics and between epistemology and ontology. Yet 
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what I am interested in here is in the situated and historical differences between large-scale 
classes of socio-materialities. 1  This does not imply, as with traditional ontology, that such 
differences reside within things. These differences among the socio-materialities are a result 
of their combined historical and situated materiality, their historical and situated use and the 
historical and situated discourse about them.  
Regarding the second pitfall, looking at cities rather obfuscates our lens, if our interest is in 
“socio-materialities,” as it pre-establishes a difference between cities and its other, be it 
nature, the rural, or the sub-urban. Following established routes of ANT and assemblage 
theory, I suggest not to start by taking cities for granted as objects, but analyse how our world 
is patterned as a socio-material world. Whether the relationships between different kinds of 
objects tell us something about the difference between the urban and its other becomes an 
empirical question then.  
This is a similar move as ANT and other constructivist theories have been pursuing for 
various other objects such as for sex and gender and which we can call, following Ian 
Hacking “historical ontology” (Hacking 2002).  
Locational patterning in a nutshell occurs because different kinds of objects have different 
properties to locate social practices. Building types, such as churches are one kind of 
locational patterning, while infrastructure networks (such as roads or water pipes) create a 
different kind. What is changing over time is the nature and relationship of such different 
kinds of locational patterning. For example, as I will show, buildings as types have become 
devalued and become replaced with technologies.  
Such changes are difficult to describe and to analyse, as they do not emerge necessarily from 
the proliferation of particular objects. In particular, buildings do not change that much, but 
their role as locational objects changes because their use as and their relationship to other 
locational objects changes. Such changes set condition how we live in a built world. It 
changes the conditions under which we produce a specific kinds of living together.  This is 
what I call a differential cosmopolitics.  
My argument goes as follows: I start by outlining the problem of spatial neighbourliness for 
ANT: ANT is based on an idea of translation, but spatial neighbourliness does not indicate 
translation. From there, I begin theorizing the form of what I call the techno-morphologies of 
society as the changing relationship between different kinds of socio-materialities. Beginning 
with the well-introduced idea of immutable mobile, I proceed to discuss mutable mobiles, 
infrastructures as immutable immobiles, and buildings as mutable immobiles. The remainder 
of the article focuses on various transfers between these four forms of socio-materiality. I 
discuss the question why ANT created so much critical resistance in the field of science, but 
was embraced in the field of architecture and design. Finally, I discuss two recent 
morphological shifts that both move away from the modern idea of buildings as mutable 
immobiles.  
ANT and the problem of spatial neighbourliness 
If we want to theorize (urban) cosmopolitics, then how do we begin? To recap, by 
cosmopolitics Isabelle Stengers understood “the construction of a common world”, where 
cosmos refers to “the unknown constituted by … multiple, divergent worlds and to the 
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articulations of which they could eventually be capable” (Stengers 2005, 995). Cosmopolitics 
then refers to the building of our worlds and how we can collectively re-negotiate it. In line 
with the topic of the book I suggest to inquire the socio-material conditions of such re-
negotiations. In particular Simmel already pointed to “cities” as the places that create such 
particular conditions (Simmel 1993). For Simmel, the main element was the fact that the 
metropolis contributes to the production of humans as “Unterschiedswesen” (Simmel 1993, 
116), literally as differential beings, as people who saviour and cherish and produce 
differences. Simmel already understood that such differential beings are made and enacted by 
“each crossing of the street”, or in other words, ubiquitous socio-materialities (Simmel 1993, 
116).  
The editors of this volume suggest focusing on a variety of “configurations”. To recap, these 
configurations are agencements, as the relational constitution and political effects of (urban) 
technologies, infrastructures, and other material-semiotic agencies; assemblies as the coming 
together of new (urban) concerns, constituencies, and publics and atmospheres as the 
coalescing of (urban) practices into shared spaces of co-existence, life-support, and survival.  
These configurations in my view deserve attention from a cosmopolitical perspective, but not 
so much because they are particularly urban. What then is specific for such configurations? 
What makes them the concerns of this book and what makes them different from other more 
classical concerns of ANT is that these relate to spatial distributions. These spatial 
distributions relate to material infrastructures and social forms that are not necessarily related 
in terms of translations, but locations (see also the introduction to this volume). In simpler 
words: what happens in a square or in a building may be established and made possible by the 
socio-materiality of this square or that building. Yet we cannot necessarily describe it as an 
actor-network, understood as a set of translations emerging from intervening actors. As Bruno 
Latour insisted, “a network is a concept, not a thing out there”; the logic of networks is not 
spatial, but translational (Latour 2005, 131).  
Mol and Law have pioneered under the heading “topologies” a set of inquiries that aimed to 
square a spatial logic with the logic of actor-networks (Mol and Law 1994). Their interest was 
getting hold of socio-material processes that could not be described as networks, because 
there were no identifiable centres of translation (Mol and Law 1994, 661). They have pointed 
to the salience of neighbourly logics of “regions” and “fluids.” Anaemia, in their case, was a 
fluid, because it could take on various guises in different circumstances. A fluid for Mol and 
Law implies that, as in their case, material infrastructures and stabilizing practices are absent 
that would create centers of translation and calculation. Here, I wish to go one step further and 
re-connect these observations with the material substrates that make villages, towns and cities, 
all the things that materially locate interactions in space.  
What differentiates the case of what happens in towns from anaemia is that in the former case 
such unpredictability and changes of form can happen even in the presence of centers of 
calculation and translation. 
To understand this difference, we need to pay attention to the position of the observer. The 
concept of translation implied that the researcher would “follow the actor”. “Following the 
actor” to cross time and space was one version of a typically modern move of social theories 
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to abstract social relations from spatial neighborliness (and insert them somewhere else) (Mol 
and Law 2001).  
But to understand the properties of spatial patterning we stop moving and following the 
actors. Describing what happens on a square is an effect of a panoramic view enabled by 
locational stability. This methodological shift is tied to its object, urban cosmopolitcs: because 
the creation of living together in a town or city is an effect of situational creation based on 
what is here, an effect of Simmel’s “crossing the street”.  
It is very much the fascination of squares that it is unclear to an observer how various 
elements relate to each other, and how they locationally co-exist, often without even noticing 
each other. Indeed, from the viewpoint of ANT it is easier to follow the cardigan of a passer-
by to its factory in Bangladesh, than to analyse what the relationship is between this person 
and the person sitting on a bench she passes by.2 The problem of analysing a square, a 
building, or other forms of spatial neighbourliness is not that we would ignore its socio-
materiality, but that the socio-materiality of a building or a square differs from the logic of 
translations. 
Understanding changing morphologies: Im/mutable Im/mobiles 
To analyse spatial neighbourliness I suggest to better understand the difference between 
traditional objects of ANT and buildings and squares and analyse their relations. We can thus 
analyse what I call the morphology of socio-materialities. We can directly lift this from, 
surprisingly, Durkheim’s ideas about social morphology, and simply drop his notion of 
“social”. Durkheim notes that social morphology changes “depending on the way in which the 
cities and the houses are constructed; depending on whether the space occupied by the society 
is more or less extensive; depending on the borders which define its limits, the avenues of 
communication which traverse it” (Durkheim 1978, 88).3 What matters here is the focus on 
relational, and historically specific socio-material forms. These forms, and here we have to 
depart from Durkheim, are certainly not hidden and need to be detected, but they are the very 
forms of how we live together. 
The morphology comprises the collective of relations of material-semiotic stabilisation and 
locational anchor points for social processes. A locational anchor point can be a tap that 
locates the possibility of drinking water, a stone that allows sitting down, a (cell-) phone that 
allows making a phone call, or a court that allows a trial in a specific location. These 
examples also indicate that anchor points differ very much in how they are connected to a 
specific location and whether and how they are part of an actor-network. A stone may be 
movable and does not rely on a network, whereas a tap depends on its connection to an 
infrastructure network of water pipes and cannot be moved without changing the 
infrastructure network. The morphologies are much more than simply “material-semiotic”. 
They are not a unified thing, but rather fractured and very complex. Furthermore, these 
morphologies describe historically specific patterns. The construction of our world is defined 
by how different kinds of objects are distributed and interlock. In the remainder of the article, 
I will try to describe the basic patterning of our world and hint at some recent changes to the 
patterning. What we can observe is basically a shift from a modern world in which patterning 
is established through typified buildings connected to material infrastructures to a world in 
which building types are replaced by locational technologies. At the same time, we can 
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observe a romantic counteraction that seeks to replace such locational technologies with 
interactions.   
For the following analysis I suggest to analyse different kinds of things that create such 
morphologies along the axis mutable/immutable and mobile/immobile which was essentially 
established, but not pursued by Latour when he created the notion of the immutable mobile 
(Latour 1987, 226). I suggest looking at the different kinds of things by comparing the way 
they are predominantly conceived in theoretical and philosophical discourses, what kind of 
agency we can ascribe to them, what constitutes crisis for these things and how law conceives 
of them. The first axis, philosophy, refers to kinds of questions and viewpoints under which 
these kinds of objects are traditionally framed by various theoretical discourses. It points to 
the fact that preceding any re-analysis through ANT, different kinds of things come with their 
own framing, but this framing continues to exert its logic even within assemblage thinking. 
The second axis asks how this generic viewpoint relates to a particular kind of socio-material 
agency in order to specify the object in an ANT language. The third axis, asks for an attendant 
crisis that allows revealing these underlying logics. This follows the established route by 
ethnomethodology, workplace studies and ANT to understand stability through its opposite. 
The last axis, legislation, refers to the political and legal processes that aim to deal with these 
kinds of crisis. 
Table 1: kinds of modern agencements: im/mutable im/mobiles 
 Immutable Mutable 
Mobile  1. Technologies (air pumps) 
Philosophy: Epistemology, 
Causality, Probability 
Agency: distributed in actor-
network 
Crisis: Breaking, Accident 
Legislation: Risk 
2. Things, Plasma (stones) 
Philosophy: Ontology 
Agency: resides with things 
Crisis: Sudden movement 
(natural disaster) 
Legislation: None, re-
categorisation as technology 
Immobile 3. Infrastructures (sewage 
pipes) 
Philosophy: Theories of Justice 
Agency: Distributed in Actor-
Network 
Crisis: Diffraction 
Legislation: Standards 
4. Buildings as Types (Court) 
Philosophy: Aesthetics, 
Semiotics 
Agency: Distributed, but not in 
Actor-Network, due to a 
multiplicity of interfaces  
Crisis: Change of Use, 
Typelessness 
Legislation: Building Codes, 
Zoning 
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Actor-Network theory has historically been based on the elaboration of one particular type of 
such stabilisations, namely what Bruno Latour called “immutable mobiles” (Latour 1987, 
226) or, in other contexts, black boxes (Latour 1987, 81), or what I would simply call 
technologies. Immutable mobiles are mobile technologies that allow the standardization and 
reproduction of actions in different places. Immutable mobiles are objects that are stabilised 
by actor-networks. Immutable mobiles, in short, are highly modern objects, dependent on 
science to invent them, metrologies to measure and standardize them and standardized 
production lines to bring them into being. Because technologies stabilize processes and make 
them predictable, they have the unique feature that they can break. A broken immutable 
mobile does not allow reproducing a process somewhere else. It becomes unusable. It needs a 
repair technician to get working again.  
The established theoretical discourse on technologies is primarily based on questions of 
epistemology: How can we know whether a driver or a malfunctioning brake caused a car 
crash? The main concepts here are centred on notions of causality and probability. Can we 
establish a causal link between the manufacturer, the car and the injured person? Or can we 
establish a probability relationship between types of cars and how often they crash? Such 
thoughts find their equivalent in legal concepts of risk. The concept of risk connects the actors 
at one end of an actor-network to whatever is the result of a technology. It is in this triangle of 
technology, causality and probability, and risk where most classical studies of ANT operate. 
This discourse as a modernist discourse sought to attribute cause and blame to one side of the 
equation. ANT intervened in this discussion by explaining the outcome through distributing 
agency through a network. 
Despite the primary focus of ANT scholars on technologies, these describe hardly the only 
kind of socio-material agency. What other kinds of objects can we discern then? 
First, there are a number of concepts to describe mobile objects that are part of strong 
networks. Latour himself has called the socio-material background of society “plasma.” For 
Latour, Plasma is “that which is not yet formatted, not yet measured, not yet socialized, not 
yet engaged in metrological chains, and not yet covered, surveyed, mobilized, or subjectified” 
(Latour 2005, 244). Plasma is not the same as the earth in the era of the anthropocene. More 
than a clear object, it is a category of leftovers. It designates whatever has not been rendered 
entirely technological. But like the earth, plasma is a category of the socio-material that is not 
translated into an actor-network, but rather stays in the background. 
Similarly, the fluids, or mutable mobiles described by Mol and Law above similarly are not 
objects in stabilising networks. (Mol and Law 1994). Such objects do not make actions 
reproducible. Rather, they have varying effects and meanings, depending on their use. Stones 
and sticks, rubble and eggs, water. These are not technologies, but things that do not specify 
their use. They are mobile, but they do not depend so much on actor-networks.  Mutable 
mobiles also do not really break. A Stick can literally break in two, but it can still be used to 
do largely what it did, when it was one piece. A CD-player, once broken, does not.  
A further variation of this theme comes from Nigel Clark who has shown in his book on 
“inhuman nature” that the focus on network building does not elucidate the materiality of the 
earth and sea, including its movement, such as earthquakes, bushfires, volcano eruptions and 
tsunamis (Clark 2010). The earth as we inhabit it, now known as “anthropocene”, is not just a 
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natural object that exists independent of social shaping. It is thoroughly socio-material. But it 
has been shaped over a very long time and its shape and its movement are not planned, it has 
no bounds, and it is impossible to delineate a network and it is a nature that can create havoc 
on society that is entirely different from breakdowns of technologies that can be repaired: 
“Natural disasters” are not a bug, they are a feature of the earth. They do not indicate that 
something that we humans have produced is broken. 
The typical discourse around mutable mobiles, plasma and the anthropocene is a discourse of 
ontology. Such discourse asks: What is fire, the earth, a stone made of? It does not focus on 
the engineered connections between actants, but on the qualities of each thing, as it exists 
prior to being connected and translated. Unlike the discourse on technology, there is no 
attendant legal discourse connected to it. The anthropocene is no legal object. In the case of 
natural disasters, fire, water or stones cannot appear as objects of regulation. If natural 
disasters become embroiled in legal and political proceedings, a shift from things to 
technologies and infrastructures occurs (Guggenheim 2014). The thingness of fire, the water 
or the earth is turned into a technological problem that connects these things to dams, power 
plants or buildings. Thus, for example in the case of Hurricane Katrina, the construction and 
eventual breaking of levees became the focus of a controversy (Wetmore 2007) or in the case 
of the Chilean Tsunami, the functioning of a warning system (Farias 2014). 
These three kinds of socio-materialities, the earth, plasma and mutable mobiles already help 
us to delineate what is left out of classical ANT ideas of socio-materiality. With their help we 
have created a bracket around the built environment. On the one hand, we have the non-
human made, the non-designed, the earth, and its myriad of things, stones, water drops, 
mountains and heaps of sand and so on. On the other hand, we have technologies as 
immutable mobiles, the small objects designed to stabilise interactions over distance, the 
thermometers, train tickets and drinking straws. In between, there is the built world. As 
mentioned before, the built world is not the same as cities. The built world extends to 
wherever humans live. 
The built world is an assemblage of things that allows locating various social practices. 
Houses, roads, paths, stadiums, and towers. Whether we can observe a difference regarding 
the socio-materiality of cities versus the rural or suburban is an empirical question, not one 
that can be answered in principle (Krause 2013). From such an morphological perspective it is 
not very relevant to observe “urbanisation” or to describe certain places as cities or villages, 
but rather to observe the changing patterning of the built world. We thus need to understand 
in more detail how the built world is patterned. To do so, we need to analyse in more detail 
the two positions left in the table. 
Technologies are mobile, yet there are also immobile technologies, and these are usually 
called infrastructures. Infrastructures are by and large technologies that are not only 
immobile, but also connected into literal networks of tubes or cables (not actor-networks that 
do not consist of material objects that are connected to each other). Infrastructures are 
immobile for the very reason to make something else mobile, both the very things it 
transports, such as electricity, sewage or water, but also to allow the circulation of other 
elements that are now unburdened with carrying what the infrastructures carry (such as 
humans, who do not need to carry buckets full of coal, once gas pipes are in place).  
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The discourse about infrastructures is not the same as the discourse on technologies.  Because 
infrastructures are potentially all inclusive, the central topos to discuss infrastructures is one 
of distribution and equality (See McFarlane and Lancione, in this volume for an example of 
the inequalities produced by the exclusion from water infrastructure). The question that sticks 
to networks of sanitation or electricity is not primarily whether it works, but whom it covers. 
The inclusionary notion of infrastructures stops where it meets the technologies that connect 
the infrastructure to human needs: The water pipes that connect toilets are the same, yet toilet 
bowls themselves come in huge varieties, showing the tastes, cultures and status of their 
users. The data sent through phone lines are the same, yet cell phones and telephones come in 
all shapes and forms. 
Infrastructures are technologies of inclusion, and as such, highly political. It is precisely 
because infrastructures are immobile that it matters so much where they go to and where they 
don't. As a legal problem, they are primarily objects of standardisation. Standardisation not 
only allows for potentially endless extension, but it also secures that infrastructures are not 
just inclusive, but inclusive to the same level of provision.  
Finally, there are mutable immobiles, or in other words, buildings understood as building 
types. Buildings understood as roofs and walls, are infrastructures, a sequence of immobile 
technologies that shelter humans from the elements. Yet buildings as building types, such as 
sports stadia, banks, or museums have a very different relationship to social processes.  As 
mutable immobiles, buildings provide touch points for functionally specific processes, but 
they do so without being technologies (Guggenheim 2009a). Buildings as building types are 
unique objects that do not depend so much on their technical properties (their walls and 
roofs), but on a secondary category, attached to this shell. The curious thing about building 
types is that these are not technological. It is not even clear how a building becomes a 
building type. Type is a most elusive quality (see Franck and Schneekloth 1994 for an 
overview).  
For this reason, most discourse on buildings as types is semiotic. It is a matter of reading and 
interpreting what a building does, not of establishing causality or probability. This is not to 
say that architects have not aimed at turning types into technology, but aiming to do so has 
never really succeeded (Guggenheim 2013a). The situation of crisis for building types does 
not occur when they break, as they cannot break, but in cases of change of use. Change of use 
is the situation when typeness of a building is changed, either by particular kinds of 
interactions, or by material means. The legal discourse on buildings is written into building 
codes, laws that determine how buildings need to be built to allow certain interactions to 
happen (Guggenheim 2009b).  
The table suggests that it operates on a properly essentialist basis, taking intrinsic features of 
objects to locate them in the table. Yet this is not so, and this is why I follow Hacking in 
calling the approach historical ontology. Genes, for example, have moved from being things 
to becoming technologies. With the development of genetic engineering, genes have stopped 
to be natural kinds and have become technologies, and accordingly they are now regulated 
with specific laws that pertain to notions of risk. Buildings on the other hand, emerged as 
types only in the 19th century and were subsequently mainly understood to be technologies 
and came to be understood as mutable immobiles since the 1970s (Guggenheim 2013a). There 
is an important difference here between buildings and genes: Genes became technologies 
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because they could actually be manipulated at some point: their travel from one category to 
the other is prompted by a change in their physical make-up and the development of a 
particular set of technologies that allows to turn them into technologies themselves. Buildings, 
on the other hand, have always been mutable immobiles (change of use has always occurred), 
but the discourse did not thematize this until the 1970s (Guggenheim 2013a). 
Critique and differential cosmopolitics 
The first issue that I would like to discuss based on such a differential cosmopolitics is the 
issue of critique. The recent disputes on assemblage urbanism have resulted in critical 
urbanists accusing ANT of being uncritical (Brenner et al. 2011). Such a claim is based on the 
idea that critique is based on a critical vocabulary, which explicitly aims at unmasking other 
truth claims (Boland 2014).  
But we could say such an idea of critique is intentionalist, rather than consequentialist. A look 
at the history of the social sciences shows that critical intentions are not the same as critical 
effects. A good example is science and technology studies and ANT itself, and the various 
ways it has portrayed its main object, the natural sciences. In what was called the science 
wars, natural scientists did not object so much to an explicit critique of the natural sciences, 
but its constructivist description (Labinger and Collins 2001). The effect of critique was a 
result of a difference between the self-description of the natural scientists and the description 
of social scientists. Such a consequentialist notion of critique suggests that critique is not a 
use of a specific discourse but a tension between a self-description and description by others. 
Such critical effects of ANT are notably absent when ANT is engaged in architecture. Indeed, 
if anything ANT is embraced by architectural theorists, architects and planners. Texts on 
ANT appear in architectural publications (Fallan 2008, Latour and Yaneva 2008) and Bruno 
Latour could even write a column in Domus, a popular Italian architectural magazine, without 
stirring any controversy. Even if we do not buy into the intentionalist logic of the “critical” 
urban scholars, it is puzzling that ANT does not have critical effects within the field it 
observes, but rather from competing external observers, namely critical urban sociologists and 
geographers. How can we explain this?4 
To understand this difference between the effects of ANT as applied to science and ANT as 
applied to architecture, I suggest looking again at the difference between buildings and things.  
ANT, as a version of STS, looks at the production of things by scientists. For STS, the main 
point is to show that things and human kinds are (socio-materially) produced and enacted. 
This observation of production and enactment is put strategically against the self-description 
of scientists (and naturalist philosophers of science), who claim that they only describe what 
exists, rather than (co-)produce their objects. The critical effects of ANT as STS come from 
this difference in accounting for the ontology of things. Scientists understand STS 
descriptions as critique because it attributes agency in different ways. From the viewpoint of 
scientists, the agency, if any, is with the natural kinds. In Ian Hackings parlance, for scientists, 
things are natural kinds. Hacking would say, adapting a phrase of G.E.M Anscombe, that such 
things exist independently of a description: “what camels, mountains, and microbes are doing 
does not depend on our words” (Hacking 2002, 108). The properties of things are thoroughly 
in the realm of ontology, traditionally understood. These properties precede the descriptions 
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of scientists and the agency of these things is independent of the descriptions of scientists. 
Whether someone gets hurt from a falling stone is independent of a scientific description of a 
falling stone.  
The main move of ANT (along with other versions of STS) has been to move the category of 
things closer to the category of technologies. For ANT, the ontology of things resides not 
exclusively within a thing, but becomes entangled in an actor-network. As an entanglement in 
an actor-network, the agency moves away from the thing and becomes distributed among 
many actors including the scientists themselves. As we can see from the table above, this 
moves things into the space of epistemology and notions of risk. In the famous example given 
by Latour, whether Ramses has died of tuberculosis is suddenly a matter not only of the 
bacteria and Ramses body, but of the entanglement of these two entities with the development 
of modern medicine and the description and classification of diseases (Latour 1999).5 As 
noted above, this shift from things to technologies is both a strategic shift of ANT as well as 
an empirically observable shift of various things that do indeed become technologies (such as 
genes).6 
But buildings and assemblages of buildings and infrastructures such as towns, cities, villages, 
are unlike natural kinds. They are constructed and architects and planners aim to make them 
have effects. They hope to endow objects with agency, and they aim to have the 
representation precede the effect (Doucet I and Cupers K 2009, Picon A et al. 2009). 
Architects would like buildings to be entangled in actor-networks with architects at the strong 
end of the network. In their view, buildings are technologies. Their own self-description fits 
exactly the description that ANT gives of the practice of scientists (that scientists themselves 
find objectionable). For architects, an ANT description of what they are doing is unlikely to 
create a tension with their self-description.7 
Further, it is part of the self-understanding of architects that buildings as constructions are 
supposed to have effects based on a confluence of multiple elements (legal, aesthetic, 
material, economical etc.) and have multiple effects.8  There may be an internal debate within 
architecture about whether and how much the practice of architecture should focus or exclude 
some of these considerations, but this debate exists precisely because there is general 
agreement that buildings do have multiple effects.  
Returning to my categorisation above, architects would like buildings to be proper 
technologies. For most architects, the worst that could be said about a building, is that it does 
not have the effects architects would like it to have. To put it differently: scientists’ 
relationship to their objects is descriptive, while architects relationship is projective. They 
want buildings to be technologies, not things. 
This situation seems to resemble the situation of STS with regard to engineering and 
technology, whose relationship to their objects is equally projective. STS began already 
during the 1980s to analyse technologies and engineering (Woolgar 1991). But there is a 
crucial difference here: STS scholars description of engineering did create critical effects, but 
not because they disagreed about the effects of technologies. What became a topic of debate, 
was the question why technologies work and how they evolve in the ways they do. STS 
scholars sought to show that the invention and production of technologies is “shaped” 
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(MacKenzie and Wajcman 1985) and “constructed” (Pinch and Bijker 1987) by social and 
political forces. This argument was opposed to a theory of engineering that saw the 
projections of engineers as politically innocent, neutral and inevitable. But in the case of 
architecture what is at stake is not the neutrality and inevitability of architectural designs, but 
the question whether their effects have anything to do with what the architects would like 
them to do. 
Given this analysis, if ANT wanted to create effects of critique, then ANT descriptions of 
what architects do are unlikely to produce these, as such descriptions merely reinforce 
architects self-image as designers of technologies. To create a tension with the self-
descriptions of architects, ANT would need to go a different route. Rather than shift the object 
away from its place in the table towards technologies, as in the case with things, it would need 
to insist on its proper place in the table.  In other words: To surprise architects we need to tell 
them the world is like natural scientists believe the world is: buildings do whatever they do 
not because they are constructed in the way they are, but because of their continuing 
existence, not so much because of the projected agency of the designer, but the ongoing 
agency of users, caretakers, cleaners and owners. Such existence, largely excluded from 
architects writings and interests, includes use, maintenance (Strebel 2011), decay, change of 
use (Guggenheim 2013b), preservation (see Göbel, this volume), and demolishing (Brand 
1995). By this, I am not claiming that the work of architects has no effects, or never the 
effects they are claiming, but that to criticize them with classical ANT descriptions, to claim 
that their work has socio-material sources and consequences is not effective as critique.  
From this observation does not follow a plea for a critical socio-materialism in the 
intentionalist critical tradition. Such a view, by shifting the agency of buildings away from 
their materiality towards economic processes does indeed challenge the architectural idea of 
agency of buildings. But it does so by placing it behind the architects back and at the expense 
of the socio-materiality of buildings. Rather, I suggest distributing agency into the hands of 
everything in front of them, both in a spatial and temporal meaning. Spatial in the sense of 
whatever and whoever operates with the buildings and temporal in the sense of whatever 
happens after they are built.  
A Romantic and a Modern Morphological Shift  
In the remainder of the chapter, I would like to briefly point out two recent morphological 
shifts. These shifts together do amount to a further challenge of the agency of buildings, but 
not as a critique of architects theories of buildings, but through morphological changes. The 
first refers to the fact that buildings become replaced by locational technologies (from field 4 
to field 1). The second refers to a movement away from buildings as types, towards 
interactions without buildings (from field 4 to field 2). Taken together, these two moves 
indicate a dissolution of the modern idea of buildings as mutable immobiles.  
To understand these moves, it is necessary to remember what could be called the modern 
morphology. In this modern settlement, the four fields of the table are neatly arranged in 
patterns, creating the cities and towns and villages dotting the world. A village, town or a city, 
according to this settlement consists of buildings connected by infrastructures (Tepasse 2001). 
These infrastructures not only form settlements, but connect settlements and even remote 
buildings into a single network.  The buildings themselves provide locational touch points 
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within these settlements for a wide variety of functionally specific interactions. These 
functional interactions are regulated by zoning laws, which connect built structures to 
buildings. This modern settlement is of relatively recent origin and has only emerged in the 
19th century with the emergence of the notion of type (Teyssot 1988), an attendant emergence 
of a wealth of new building types (Markus 1993) and later on, laws to standardize and 
regulate these types.   
Hollow Atmospheres and the Technification of Locational Functions 
The first element of a changing morphology is what I suggest to call the emergence of the 
locational functions without atmospheres. Examples for such locational functions are ATMs, 
vending machines (for condoms and sex toys in public toilets, for food and drinks almost 
anywhere, for syringes in public squares, for art) (Segrave 2002), cafes in bike stores, 
exhibitions in public spaces such as “art windows”, praying points in places that are not 
churches, so called baby-flaps to dispose unwanted newborns in blocks of flats. 
To understand the problem of the technification of locational functions, we need to return 
briefly to the idea of building types. As types, buildings as wholes locate certain specific 
social functions. Banks locate “doing a bank” and family homes locate “doing family”. It is 
very much part of the notion of building type that it does not specify what role individual 
building parts play in doing x. This is not a failure of architects, or the notion of type, but it is 
very much part of the buildings as mutable immobiles. The reason for this vagueness of 
building types comes from the multiplicity of interface points a building offers for any kind of 
interaction. A “family home” offers potentially endless points of finding and doing “family”, 
from its outer shape to spatial partitioning into bedrooms and bathrooms, to the design of 
particular elements such as a shower or a storage space to paintings and signage. 
“Atmospheres” are crucial notions here as they indicate the confluence of all these elements 
into one singular bodily experience that integrates all these elements (Boehme 1993, also see 
Göbel in this volume).  
Hollow atmospheres splice this confluence up in particular ways. All these technologies re-
define the relationship between buildings and interactions: First of all, these are all locational 
technologies. They do not abstract interactions from locations, such as cell phones with 
banking software does. An ATM or a vending machine is tied to a place, and forces the user 
to go to this place to do whatever these machines enable to do. The reason these are locational 
technologies – and not digital - derives from either of two problems: Human bodies, which 
move around have needs that cannot wait or these technologies distribute physical objects (or 
both).  
Second, these are technologies, in the narrow sense used here. These are not instances of 
change of use, in which a building is changed in its use in a large-scale mode, with a strong 
emphasis on interactions and built interventions that override pre-existing typological 
elements, although sometimes the distinction between hollow atmospheres and change of use 
may be blurry. 9  
Locational technologies operate by ignoring buildings as types, and indeed, by using 
buildings as nothing more than shells or containers to perform their locational function. They 
do this by reducing what buildings as types performed to its technological core, and disposing 
 13 
all atmospheric, but also room-based elements. For example, an ATM reduces the practice of 
“doing banking” to an exchange in which personal data of a customer are traded with bank 
notes. It sheds the face-to-face meeting between clerk and customer, it sheds the teller 
window and all its attendant security mechanisms, it sheds the barriers that direct customers 
into the right queue and it sheds the back-offices and the toilets and staff-break rooms. Some 
of these elements still exist – somewhere, in a non-descript office building – others are no 
more needed at all. 
The “atmosphere” of banking, understood as a confluence of various elements is not just 
changing in the case of locational technologies, but simply inexistent. The building to which 
locational technologies are attached has no obvious connection to the locational technology. 
This has wide-ranging and little discussed repercussions for our understanding of society: 
buildings lose their athmospherical connection to what is happening in and around them.  
Assemblies beyond buildings  
The second change of morphology is both a reaction to, but also made easier by the first. A 
common observation about contemporary locational practices refers to the fact that the 
internet delocalizes the world (Crang 2000, Kitchin and Dodge 2005), and in particular it 
removes various interactions from their connection to particular buildings. It removes 
practices such as shopping from stores, political protest from squares and praying from 
churches (while giving it other, spatial equivalents (Crang 2000)). This does not mean that 
space becomes unimportant or that society is in any way less spatial, but it makes various 
interactions independent of specific buildings, it does away with even the technification of 
locational functions, at least when they do not depend on human bodies or physical products 
being exchanged. 
Against such apparent delocalisations emerge forms of assembly without buildings, or what 
Salmond called “momentary communities” (Salmond 2010). I am thinking here of flashmobs, 
botellones, holiday camps, protest camps, open-air festivals, and in its most pronounced 
version, temporary gatherings such as Burning Man (Gilmore and Proyen 2005, Chen 2009). 
In the literature on such momentary communities, there is usually a stress on how locational 
digital technologies are used to coordinate these events (Gordon and e Silva 2011, Wilken and 
Goggin 2013). The argument is based on the assumption that digital media are devoid of 
places and from there point out that new technologies need to bring back locations. However, 
when we ask what these events replace, we could rather say that they replace existing forms 
of locating interactions through squares and buildings. All these events are predicated on the 
idea of creating temporary locations devoid of infrastructure, and devoid of building types as 
stabilisers.  
They appear as romantic counter-practices to the modern logic of buildings as technologies 
(see Estalella and Corsin Jimenez in this volume for a case study). Buildings, seen through the 
light of these practices appear not as enabling of societal practices, but as restrictive. Through 
negation, these practices aim to highlight that modern society has created a fit between rules 
and its locational technologies.10  
Rather, they seek to return to seemingly primary locational technologies of stage and centre, 
of paths created simply through the patterning of tents. As is most obvious in the case of 
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Burning Man, such events cannot escape the very logic they would like to transgress, of 
planning codes and its functional logics, of money and payments (and ways to create or 
transfer money). But they at least create a fiction of detachment from functional systems and 
specifically, of its infrastructural and building related supports. They create an atmosphere in 
which interaction is seemingly not mediated by buildings, but predicated on face-to-face-ness, 
on density and on chance. The attraction of Burning Man is not just to bring like-minded 
people together, but also to create a social form that pretends to minimise its dependency of 
locational technologies and mutable immobiles.  
As such, these practices resemble very much classical sociological definitions of the city as a 
way of life, as a place to meet strangers, yet they do so in the desert or farmers fields. They 
are attempts to re-create the features of a city without infrastructure and buildings. Referring 
to the scheme above, we could say they aim to move located interactions from mutable 
immobiles to mutable mobiles,  plasma and things.  
Conclusion 
In this article I have tried to come up with a way to analyse socio-materialities that allows to 
frame recent changes of morphology away from the urban-rural distinction. I have introduced 
some concepts to discuss the changing patterning of different kinds of socio-materialities. I 
have ended by describing two shifts that are about to create a different kind of morphology: 
the technification of locational functions and assemblies beyond buildings. They are 
indicative of two tensions that tear apart what is still an underlying agreement about modern 
patterning. But each of them also allows us to see the modern settlement afresh. The modern 
settlement was never the horror dreamt up by modern urbanism, because, as should have 
become clear, buildings as types do not lend themselves easily to become proper 
technologies. But at the same time, the modern settlement also gave rise to a particular kind of 
arrangement of material agencies, in which multiple objects interlocked, without prioritizing a 
particular kind of material agency. Modern cosmopolitics implied a precarious alternation and 
correlation between relying on things, technologies, buildings and infrastructures. The two 
shifts indicate that this precarious alternation is falling apart.  
On the one hand, buildings lose their typeness and become mere shells. All locational work of 
the type is replaced by technologies. This has the effect that large-scale patterning is atomized 
into its constituent parts and at the same time every building seems to technically mimic the 
totality of locational functions. Whether a building is notionally a bank, a church or a 
supermarket matters less and less, as ATMs, prayer rooms and vending machines appear in 
buildings of all types. Building a common world tends to lose its footing in buildings. 
Architecture, as a form of creating a shared world and locating specific kinds of interactions, 
matters less and less. 
On the other hand, assemblies beyond buildings strive for the opposite but achieve something 
rather similar. In the first instance, the dream of getting rid of modernistic constraints in the 
first instance becomes possible because of ubiquitous technologies that allow to quickly co-
ordinate large numbers of people. The idea that the absence of concrete implies an absence of 
rules and constraints furthermore ascribes too much agency to buildings and not enough to 
interaction rules. It runs the danger of misunderstanding a particular kind of material agency 
for a change in social form.  
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What we have seen very little recently, unfortunately, are attempts to recreate the shape of 
modern villages, towns and cities in different and novel ways, in ways that would not bypass 
buildings but recreate the interrelationship of buildings and technologies in novel and exiting 
ways. This is both a result of a total loss of belief in large scale planning, while at the same 
time restricting what is possible with legal regulations that constrain what has become an 
empty shell anyways. Maybe we will see sometimes the return of architectural utopias. 
 
 
                                                
1 As a strategy of theorizing, I follow Philippe Descola in his attempt to rewrite nature/culture, 
but rather than analysing how different groups conceive of this distinction, my aim is to 
analyse western ideas within this distinction (Descola 2013). 
2 For an attempt to study such open spaces see (Kärrholm 2008). 
3 My approach should not be confused with what is known within architecture as the various 
schools of “urban morphology”, who study the patterning of buildings within cities. These 
schools though show no interest for the problem of socio-material agency. For an overview 
see Moudon (1997). 
4 An uncharitable explanation would be that the discourse within architecture has for a long 
time now been one of embracing and mimicking whatever is en vogue in other fields and that 
the uptake of ANT within architecture is not a sign of positioning, but simply of parroting 
what has become fashionable elsewhere.  
5 This is what Sismondo calls the post-Kantian preference of representation over effects 
(Sismondo 1993). 
6 Writing from the viewpoint of historical ontology, we could say that the emergence of ANT 
and STS more generally as a descriptive shift from things to technologies is a result of this 
actual move of things that increasingly become technologies.  
7 Though note, there are rare, but nevertheless very interesting examples of architects who did 
not imagine buildings as technologies, such as for example Cedric Price (Price et al. 2003, for 
a discussion, see Guggenheim 2013a). 
8 To give a most basic example of this self-understanding, the prospectus to study architecture 
at ETH, one of the worlds top architecture department states: „Architecture is concerned with 
the search for creative solutions in the field of tension between construction, the satisfaction 
of living and working needs and the preservation of a livable, designed environment. … 
[Architects] respond to social, economic and environmental changes.” The BA course 
includes lectures on urban design, physics, architecture and art, economics, sociology, and 
law among others. http://www.arch.ethz.ch/en/studium/studienangebot.html .   
9 Note that this is different from “multi-use” of historic buildings such as churches (Isaiasz 
2008), as these churches were used for many different things, yet were built as strong building 
types. “Multi-use spaces” on the other hand were built for many different things, and nothing 
in particular (Zeidler 1983). 
10 While assemblies without buildings are proposed in the rich north as a romantic form of 
protest against the modern morphology, Simone argues that in Johannesburg “people“ act „as 
infrastructure“ to indicate that in cities in the south this settlement  is broken by default  
(Simone 2004).  
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